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Marx, Shumpeter, Kuznets, and others have  A central bank in a developing country must
written about how technical innovations affect  have a development orientation.  The single
economic development, but little attention has  most important criterion of central bank effec-
been paid to how financial and fiscal innovations  tiveness is the extent to which the bank's
affect development.  policies reduc,. overall costs and risk on credit
transactions.
Financial innovations tend to reduce transac-
tion costs and risks - both subjective and  To perform its regulatory function effec-
objective - and thus to expand and integrate  tively and to promote a sound, healthy financial
capital markets. Financial development acce.er-  or credit system, a central bank must have a
ates the pace of economic development by en-  degree of autonomy.  Since 1965 this autonomy
couraging savings and investment and increasing  has been eroded in both the developed and the
output.  developing countries because of the impact of
fiscal policy.
Public or govenmient intervention -
through a govenmment's  central bank - is  The result has been unstable credit and the
essential to a sound credit system.  intemational debt crisis, which already affect the
development process and the functioning of
intemational credit markets.
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iiiThe  role  of the  introduction  and  diffusion  of innovations  in  the  process  of
economic  development  has  been  well  recognized  in  the  literature  since  the  seminal
works  of  Marx,  Schumpeter,  and  Kuznets.  However,  little  attention  has  been  paid
to  the  significance  of social  innovations  - in  particular,  financial  and  fiscal
innovations.  Financial  innovations  tend  to  reduce  transaction  costs  and  risk -
both  subjective  and  objective  - and  as  a  result  bring  about  widening,  deepening,
and  integration  of  capital  markets. Such  financial  development  accelerates  the
pace  of  econcmic  development  through  its  favorable  impact  on  saving,  investment,
and  output.
The relationship  between  finance  and development  and the precise  role of
financial  innovations  are  discussed  in  Section  I,  while  Section  !I deals  with
the  nature  and  characteristics  of financial  innovations.  Section  III  examines
the  role  of  policy  intervention  in  quickening  the  pace  of  fir&.  cial  development
in the developing  countries.  The nature  and character'  -i  of financial
innovations,  essential  for  financing  small  farm  and  nonfarm  arises  and  for
mobilizing  resources  from middle- and low-income  groups it,  .he  developing
countries,  are  illustrated  by  a case  study  of an  innovative  b4a'-  in  Section  IV.
Some  concluding  observations  are  made  in the  final  section.
X. F*IJNECB  AMD  DZVEW"LORUT
The  pace and  pattern  of economic  development  are  a function,  as Adam Smith
perceptively  observed two  centuries  ago, of  the sequential  and circular
relationship  between  the  growth  of (a)  division  ot labor  and (b)  extent  of the
market  for  real  goods  and  services.'  The  innovations  of  money  and finance  tend
to increase  the  size  and  extent  of exchange  relationships  or markets  and thus
promote  division  of labor.  This increases  returns  to scale and technical
change.
Money as a unit of account  and  medium  of exchange  reduces  the transaction
and search  costs  involved  in  barter  transactions.  Money  as a store  of value
provides  time  for  making  purchase  decisions,  thus  reducing  the  risk  of  ill-formed
and  hasty  decisions. 2 Thus,  through  reduction  of transaction  costs  and risk,
money tends  to enlarge  the  size  of the  market  for  real  goods  and  services  and
hence the possibility  of division  of labor - the two interacting,  mutually
reinforcing  forces  that  account  for  sustained  economic  development.
Just as  money  reduces  transaction  costs  and  risk  for  contemporary  exchanges
across  space,  credit  or financial  instruments  reduce  costs  of transactions  and
risk  for intertemporal  exchanges  of goods  and services. It is thus that the
existence  of a credit  or a capital  market  enlarges  the  market  for real  goods
and  services. The Impact  of  money  and  capital  markets  on the  market  for  real
goods  and  services  is  similar  to that  of  reduction  of transport  costs  on trade
or exchanges  across  space.
Unlike  the  market  for  real  goods  and  services,  credit  or capital  markets  are2
inherently  imperfect  in  the  -ense  that  there  is  no  certainty  about  the  completion
of a credit  transaction.  A credit  transaction  involves  a relationship  between
a  lender  and  a  borrower  in  time  (hence,  in  the  context  of  uncertainty).  A credit
transaction  is  completed  only  when  the  borrower  repays  the  amount  borrowed,  and
there  can  be no certainty  about  this  repayment.
First,  there  is  the  borrower's  risk:  the  expected  excess  income  required  for
repayment  may  or  may  not  materialize.  In  addition,  there  is  the  lender's  risk,
which  has two  elements. One  relates  to  the  same  risk  facing  the  borrower,  but
the  lender  may  have  a  different  perception  of it. The  other  element  relates  to
the  borrower's  willingness  to repay;  even if  he is able  to repay,  he may  not.
Both  the  lender's  and  the  borrower's  expectations  with  regard  to  the  outcome  in
time - their  perceptions  of the  riskiness  of their  ventures  - are subjective,
based  as they  are  on the  data  and  information  available  to  each  one  of them  and
each  one's  ability  to interpret  them. 3
Note  that  one  part  of  the  risk  is  double  counted.  The  borrower  has  a certain
perception  of the  risk  he faces  with regard  to, say,  his investment  project.
The lender,  too, takes  into account  the same risk ab.ut  which  he may have a
different  perception  or expectation.  If  the  borrower's  subjective  risk  premium
is  rl,  the  lender's  risk  or risk  premium  is  r,  + ar,  (as  the  lender  is  likely  to
be more conservative  in his expectations  than the borrower) plus r2,  his
subjective  risk  with  regard  to the  borrower's  willingness  to repay  - the  moral
hazard  problem. 4 The total  risk  premium,  thus,  would  be
r,  +  ar,  +  ar,  +  r 2.
This means that the  borrower's  expected  rate  of return  or profit,  R, on his
investment  should  exceed  the  pure  interest  cost,  i, by this  magnitude,  that  is,
r 1 (a +  1) +  r2 pluS  tl  (lender's  transaction  costs) and tb  (borrower's
transaction  costs).  For a credit  transaction  to take place the following
condition  should  be satisfied:
p > rl  (a  + 1)  + r2 +  (tl +  tb)  +  i-
Credit  or  capital  markets  come  into  being  and  evolve  as  a  result  of  financial
innovations  that  tend  to  reduce  the  total  of  r (representing  r 1 (a  + 1)  + r 2)  and
of transactions  costs (representing  t,  +  tb)  to a  level that is mutually
acceptable to  both  lenders and  borrowers.  The  evolving nature  and
characteristics  of these  markets,  the  dealers  and the  other  participants,  and
the credit  or financial  instruments  are crucially  shaped  by the financial
innovations  that  are  feasible  in  a given  socioeconomic  context.
Financial  innovations  tend  to  reduce  the  lender's  subjective  risk  to  an  extent
much greater than they tend to increase  transaction  costs of lending  and
borrowing.  Risk, of course,  can be reduced  with better and more accurate
information,  but this would involve  an increase  in transaction  costs to the
lender,  to the  borrower,  or to both.  Hence,  to be effective,  an innovation
should  have  a  risk-reducing  effect  much  greater  than  its  cost-increasing  effect.3
II.  *  ZREIaL  ..Ih1T.IO
The evolution  and integration  of capital  markets  through  the introduction
and  diffusion  of  financial  innovations  are  not  possible  without  some  occupational
specialization  in the  field  of credit  and  finance. Dealers  and intermediaries
are significant. Isolated  and individualized  financial  transactions  (lending
and  borrowing)  among  households  and  firms  are  quite  important  in  certain  sectors
of the  economy  like  agriculture  and  small  enterprises,  but for  capital  markets
to evolve,  it is essential  to  have dealers  who specialize  in financial  claims
or instruments.
A dealer  need  not  be an intermediary;  he need  not  borrow  in order  to lend.
Even  for  a financial  intermediary,  his  lending  activity  is  crucial  because  his
ability  to  borrow  depends  on the  quality  of  his lending. A credit  contract  is
completed  only  when the  borrower  repays  his  debt  to the  dealer  in .erms  of the
original  contract.  Hence,  it  is  the  lender's  subjective  risk  and  the  innovations
that reduce  this  risk  that  assume  critical  significance.  What,  then,  are  the
nature  and  characteristics  of such  innovations?
Nature  and  Characteristics
The degree of subjective  risk depends  on how well a  lender  knows the
prospective  borrower  and  can  evaluate  the  borrower's  ability  and  willingness  to
repay.  Of course,  the lender  can demand  information  from the borrower  and
appraise  it,  but such  information  may  be costly  to  collect  and  may not  even  be
reliable.
The  innovation  of a  nersonal  guarantee  reduces  rink  without  at  the  same  time
increasing  transaction  costs.  Such  a gaarantee  generally  must  be by a person
or firm who has a well-known  history  and business  reputation  for financial
integrity,  considerable  assets,  and  a business  that  enables  him to judge the
character  and  nature  of the  prospective  borrower. A well-established  trader
giving a personal  guarantee  for another trader,  not known to the lender,
illustrates  the  nature  of this  innovation. It is thus  that  a dealer's  market
expands.
This device  of a personal  guarantee  becomes  feasible  only  when the  market
participants  adhere  to  a common  code  of  business  ethics;  violation  of this  code
leads  to  moral  reprobation  and  excommunication  fror  the  market. Such  a  code  and
sanctions  also  provide  the  logic  for  the  innovation  of all  types  of cooperative
credit arrangements  among relatively  homogeneous  groups, who  may not  be
considered  creditworthy  by  other  dealers  and  intermediaries.  Lending  by  a  dealtr
to individuals  forming  a homogeneous  and  cohesive  g:oup  against  individual  as
well as collective  guarantees  also  belongs  to this  class  of innovations. 5
The  innovation  of short-term  credit  that  is  renewed  or  rolled  over (provided
repayments  are  made regularly  and  in time)  is a very  economical  and effective
way to select  reliaole  and  dependable  borrowers  or te avoid  the risk  relating
to adverse selection.  Short-term  loans for working capital or liquidity
requirements  have this  rationale;  a regular  borrower,  who borrows  as well as4
repays  in  time  and  whc  has the  need  to  borrow  at regular  intervals  for  a known
remunerative  purpose,  poses  much less risk than does a new borrower  without
previous  history. The loan  size  in these  cases  is  a function  of the  degree  of
the  lender's  knowledge  of the  borrower;  what  might  appear  as credit  rationing
is  merely  a device  for  reducing "  k  to  acceptable  levels.
The innovation  of interlinkin'  bredit  transactions  with trade  transactions
enables  a trader  to  avoid  the  moral  hazard  problem. If  a far-.Aer  regularly  sells
his output  through  a trader,  the  latter  can  deduct  the  principal  and interest
relating  to his loan to the  farmer  from  the  sale  proceeds  due to the farmer.
This  interlinking  of  credit  and  goods  markets  to  reduce  the  lender's  risk  is  the
device  used  by all  types  of  cooperative  credit  and  marketing  societies.  On the
same  principle,  a landlord  can provide  credit  to an agricultural  laborer  or
tenant  by interlinking  credit  market  with  the  labor  market. 6
Short-term  lending  against personal  or collective  guarantees  and/or to
dependable  and  reliable  borrowers  is  possible  only  when  the  dealers/lenders  have
fairly personal knowledge and  information  about the borrowers and  their
occupations  and  assets. But  the  market  for  loans  based  on  such  personal  contacts
and on moral  or social  sanctions  is  limited. For  enlarging  and  expanding  the
market,  some  objective  substitute  for  personal  guarantees  (formal  or informal)
becomes  essential  - a substitute  that  can  have  a legal  sanction. This is the
logic  of the  innovation  of collateral  or security,  comprising  real  or financial
assets.
If  the  borrower  deals  in  or  possesses  goods/assets  that  are  easily  marketable
without  much  risk  of  capital  loss,  the  loan  size  could  be  made  a function  of the
value  of such  assets. rne  risk  of capital  loss  can  be reduced  by having  a loan
size that is smaller  than the  market  value  of such assets,  thus forcing  the
borrower  to  use  his  own  money  to  finance  this  margin. This  security-cum-eguity
type  of innovation  reduces  the  lender's  subjective  risk  in  two  ways. First,  the
risk  arising  from  the  possible  unwillingness  of the  borrower  to  repay  virtually
disappears. Second,  the risk relating  to the borrower's  ability  to pay is
reduced  as the  borrower,  because  of  his  equity  stake,  is induced  to  manage  his
business  as efficiently  as  he can.
This  innovation,  along  with  the  innovation  of  credit  money,  create  conditions
for the emergence  of a bank with the capacity  to create  credit  and thus to
enlarge  its  scale  of operations  and  take  advantage  of  economies  of  scale,  which
tend to reduce  transaction  costs  of both the  bank as well as its  borrowers.
Further,  the  bank  can  reduce  risk  in  a  number  of  ways. With  economies  of  scale,
it  can  specialize  in  and  standardize  certain  types  of financLal  transactions  and
thus  reduce  risk through  better  expertise. Its scale  enables  it to pool and
spread  risks  (the  "Law  of  Large  Numbers"),  which  is  the  basis  of insurance.
The security-cum-equity  type  of innovation  also  creates  the ccnditions  for
the  emergence  of securities  markets  - markets  for financial  instruments  like
all  types  of bills,  bonds,  and  shares. This innovation  of securities  markets
reduces  transaction  costs  for  both  lenders  and  borrowers.  The  lender's  risk  is
reduced  because  of the  information  provided  by the  market  dealers  and  brokers
to the lenders  and the  negotiability  and marketability  of securities  of all
types.  The  borrower's  risk  is  reduced  as  a  result  of  the  innovation  of  the  joint5
stock  company  with limited  liability.
Where such securities  markets  do not evolve  because  of specific  economic
conditions,  there  emerges  the  innovation  of  a  universal  bank.7  A universal  bank
finances  both short-term  and long-term  credit requirements  specifically  of
industrial  enterprises. The lender's  risk with this innovation  is reduced
because  of the  security  or collateral  provision  and  also  because  or the  active
involvement  of the  universal  bank in the entrepreneurial-managerial  decisions
of enterprises  through  its  representation  on the  supervisory  boards  of these
enterpri&es  .8
This management  role of the  bank has the same effect in reducing  the
lender's  risk as has the equity  type of innovation. The innovation  of the
universal  bank leads to the evolution  of refined techniques  of cash flow
analysis9  and  project  evaluation.  These  techniques  reduce  the  subjective  risk
of the  lender  by enabling  him to  make  a reasonably  accurate  assessment  of risk
relating  to the  ability  to  pay  of the  borrowing  enterprise.
It is somewhat  difficult  for  one  type  of dealer  to finance  the  acquisition
of,  and  take  as security,  assets  with  which  that  type  is  not familiar. Hence,
each class  of dealers  tends  to specialize  in one type  of assets  and thus in
dealing  with one  class  of borrowers;  its  technology  for  transactions  and risk
appraisal  is in tune  with  this  type  of assets  and  the  class  of borrowers. It
would increase  both transaction  costs  and risk  for  a dealer  with a technology
suited  for  one  type  of transaction  to  undertake  a different  type,  unrelated  to
the  one  in  which  he has  specialized.
For  example,  a commercial  bank  t1hat  over  time  has  acquired  a technology  for
financing  medium-large  firms  in  industry  and  trade  could  not  finance  agriculture
or small  enterprises  without  first  acquiring  a  new  type  of technology  suited  to
these transactions.  Informal  market dealers  have a  technology  suited for
financing  small  enterprises  of all types,  and if a commercial  bank wants to
expand  its  business  in this  type  of transactions,  it  would  be more economical
and  effective  for  it to lend  to informal  market  dealers  than  to lend  directly
to  the  primary  borrower. 1 0
A given  technology  is  related  to  a certain  class  of transactions,  comprising
certain  financial  instruments,  a certain  class  of  borrowers,  and  certain  assets
as security.  Dealers who have acquired  certain technology/expertise  for
historical ceasons  would find it more economical  to undertake  transactions
related  to  their  technology  than  to  venture  into  fields  that  require  a  different
type  of technology.  To  deal  with  a  different  class  of  borrowers  with  different
assets  requiring  financing  and  as security,  tberefore,  is a function  of a new
type of dealer.  Innovations  that  expand  and deepen  the  scope  of the  capital
markets  are  generally  introduced  by new  entrepreneurs  and  a  new type  of dealer
whose technology  and  expertise,  as well as financial  instruments,  differ  from
those  of the  existing  dealers. It is thus  that  new  markets  evolve.' 1
Since financial  innovations  lead to a variety  of specialized  dealers  and
markets,  they create  a diversity  of financial  instruments,  each of them  with
unique  characteristics  and features.  This diversity  of financial  products
enables  primary  savers/borrowers  to make a choice  among instruments  that is6
better  suited  to their  special  requirements.  Such  diversity  stimulates  saving
in the form of financial  assets  as well as borrowing  that promotes  a more
efficient  allocation  and  use of resources  that  can  be invested  Further,  the
competition  for mobilizing  financial  resources  from the primary  savers  among
this array of specialized  dealers tends  to integrate  the various financial
markets.
Once the markets in specialized  credit instruments  evolve,  a  large
intermediary  - commercial  or investment  bank - can  take  advantage  of economies
of specialization  along with economies  of scale and scope. 12 Thus, this
intermediary  can  deal in  all  types  of credit  or financial  instruments,  leading
to the  emergence  after  1960  of so-called  department  store  banking.  13  Because
of technological  externalities,  interrelationship  among markets for various
credit  instruments,  and technological  revolution  in the field  of information
gathering,  processing,  and transmission,  this innovation  tends to reduce
transaction  costs for  both lenders  and borrowers,  and to reduce  the lender's
risk. 
14 Commercial  and investment  banking  tend to  merge  with each  other,  and
loans and  securities  become close substitutes,  giving rise to so-called
securitization  of loans  and  as  a  result  financial  innovations  like  note  issuance
facilities,  currency  and interest  rate  Swaps,  options  and futures. 15 (This  is
happening,  for example,  in the Euro-dollar  market  as well as in the credit
markets  of the  United  States.) All these  innovations  relate  largely  to global
markets; separate institutions  dealing in specialized  credit or financial
instruments  particularly  in local  and  national  markets  have  their  own  distinct
niches  and  are important  for  cultivating  and  nurturing  new  markets. 1'
Prfjconditions
What, then, are the preconditions  for the emergence  of such financial
innovations,  whose  nature  and  characteristics  have  been  described?
First,  innovations  require  trust  and  confidence  among  the  market  participants.
This general climate is reinforced  by an effective  and enforceable  legal
framework. If  lenders  and  borrowers  have  to  resort  to legal  safeguards  for  the
greater  part of their  dealings,  the transaction  costs  would  be prohibitive.
Without  enforceable  legal  sanctions,  the  degree  of  risk  in  financial  transactions
would  be inordinately  high.
Second,  there  must be monetary  stability. The  uncertainty  inherent  in all
credit transactions  would be  accentuated  without some degree of monetary
stability. Without  it, the  subjective  risk  of the  market  participants  would
increase  and  their  confidence  in the  market  would  be shaken.
Finally,  there  should  be no legal  or customary  obstacle  to experimentation
and  innovation,  particularly  with  regard  to  informal  credit  markets.  Established
formal  dealers  are  reluctant  to  change  over  from  one  type  of  technology/expertise
to another. To them,  the  subjective  risk  as  well as transaction  costs  for  the
new untried technology  appear  much higher than those relating  to existing
technology.
Since informal  market  dealers operate  largely on the basis of personal7
irformation  and  knowledge,  they  are in a  much  better  position  to iJentify  new
opportunities  for financial  transactions  (that  is,  new markets  requiring  new
products  and  processes). Moreover,  their  transaction  costs  and risk  for such
experimentation  are  relatively  low. With  the  growth  and  expansion  of  the  formal
markets,  the  informal  dealers  have  a  certain  compulsion  to  innovate.  Quite  often
new  markets  with  new  innovative  products  are  created  and  nurtured  by the  informal
market  dealers.  Once  these  new  markets  grow  to  a  certain  size,  the  formal  markets
with  their  scale  economies  are  in  a  position  to introduce  the  new products  and
thus compete  effectively  with the informal  markets.  This vital rnle of the
informal  markets  in  identifying  new  opportunities  for  financial  transactions  and
in introducing  innovations  for creating  and nurturing  new markets  is little
appreciated  in the  literature  as well  as  by the  policymakers."
The  nnovative  ability  of the  informal  capital  market  is  demonstr'  at an
international  level  by the  functioning  of the  Euro-Dollar  market. l'.-  Euro-
market  !s quite  similar  to the  informal  credit  markets  in several  developing
countries-  -the  markets  that  are  out  of  reach  of  the  national  regulatory  agencies.
The forme: is relevant  for large participants--large  corporations,  public
entities  and  sovereign  governments--,  while  the  latter  for  small  enterprises  of
all types.  However,  both the markets are characterized  by relatively  low
transaction  costs  for  borrowers  partly  because  of  this  freedom  from  regulation.
This Euro-market  has  introduced  several innovations  or  new  financial
instruments,  that  have  widened  the  choice  with regard  to instruments  for  both
savers/investors  and borrowers;  investors  now can choose instruments  with
characteristics  (relating  to  yield,  liquidity,  risk  and  transaction  costs),  thaj
they prefer  and similarly  borrowers  too have a wider choice  with regard  to
instruments  with different  cost-risk  combinations.
The  major  innovations  introduced  in  this  market  tried  to  deal  with the  risks
arising  from  the  volatility  of  interest  rates  and  exchange  rates,  resulting  from
the  breakdown  after  1973  of the  Brettonwoods  system  of  fixed  exchange  rates  and
the  structural  payment  imbalances  among  the  developed  countries;  these  are  also
the innovations  which are relevant  for the developing  countries that are
creditworthy.
The  most  interesting  innovation  is  the  development  of  the  swap  market  in  both
currency and  interest rate swaps.  This has been  the most radical or
revolutionary  innovation  that  has been introduced  in the  international  market
in  recent  years,  as it tends  to reduce  the  risk  to  borrowers  arising  from  the
uncertainties  relating  to interest  rate  and  exchange  rate  changes.
III.  ROLE  X.'  PUBLIC  POLICY
Innovations  are generally  spontaneous,  but they can  be induced  by policy
intervention. Innovations  induced  by policy  intervention  are of two types:
one is cost and risk reducing,  while the other relates to overcoming  and
offsetting  the  negative  impact  of  general  policy  and  is  cost  and  risk  increasing.
Cost-Risk  Increasing  Intervention8
Interest  rate ceilings  and credit  allocation  quotas (for example,  those
prescribed  for  commercial  banks  by central  bank/governmont  authorities  with a
view  to  enlarging  the  flow  of  credit  to  small  entexprises  of  all  types,  including
those  in  the  agricultural  sector)  are  self-defeating  and,  in  fact,  raise  the  cost
of  credit  to  the  very  sector  that  the  government  intends  to  support.l8  Since  the
transaction  costs  and  risk  for  dealing  with  small  enterprises  are  higher  for  the
banks  than  those  for  medium-large  enterprises  in  the  trade-industry  sectors,  the
banks either  would not lend to the small  sector  or forestall  the government
directives  by passing  on a greater  part  of their  costs  and  risks  to the  small
sector through  noninterest  charges of various types. 19  If the banks did
literally  implement  government  directives,  their  financial  viability  would  be
adversely  affected,  and  this  would  endanger  tne  health  of the  financial  system,
resulting  in  undesirable  consequences  for  economic  development  generally  and  for
development  of  the  small  sector  in  particular.  Anyway,  it  is  simply  meaningless
to fix  the  price  as well  as the  quantity;  this  would  lead  to  credit  rationing
and  queues  and  thus  considerable  scope  for  corruption.
Arbitrary  interest  rate  ceilings  on  lending  by the  banks  lead  to  low  interest
rates  on deposits,  and this  has the effect  of diverting  private  saving  into
commodities  or private  lending  - bcth of  which  adversely  affect  the  evolution
of financial  markets.
Another instance of  negative policy  intervention  is  the  variety of
restrictions  placed  on the functioning  of the informal  credit  market.  This
market  actually  mobilizes  resources  from  and  purveys  credit  to sectors  that  are
generally  not within  the  purview  of the forma'.  market.  Restrictions  of its
activity,  therefore,  either  raise  costs of credit  or block credit to these
sectors. Furthermore,  the  resources  that  this  market  mobilizes  may  be diverted
to  commodity  hoarding  and  speculation.
Cost-Risk  Reducing  Intervention
There are, however,  types  of intervention  that  have an impact  similar  to
financial  innovations  or  that  may  induce  such  innovations.  For  example,  deposit
insurance  would reduce the subjective  risk of primary  savers and thus may
increase  the rate of financial  saving. Viable  credit  guarantee  schemes  for
agriculture  and  small  enterprises  may  reduce  the  subjective  risk  of the  dealers
and may induce  them to lend to these  sectors. A deliberate  policy  of well-
designed  extension  (through  branch  expansion)  of the  banking  system  along  with
credit  allocation  quotas  and  some  fixed  sum  subsidy  may induce  banks  to change
their  agenda  and technology  so as to reduce  the  overall  transaction  costs  and
risk  to  both  lenders  and  borrowers.  Effective  and  self-supporting  crop  insurance
schemes  may reduce  the  risk  of lending  to the  farm  sector  and  also  may result
in resource  mrobilization  greater  than would otherwise  occur.  Improving  the
access  of farmers  and  small  enterprises  to  financial  and technical  consultancy
services  can  raise  their  productivity,  thus  reducing  the  risk  of lending. 20
By  exempting  saving  in  the  form  of  financial  assets  from  taxable  income,  the
real rates  of return  on financial  saving  can  be raised  and thus the rate of9
financial  saving  could  increase. 2 1 A fixed  sum  subsidy  to,  say, a commercial
bank  to  cover  the  initial  fixed  cost  of  acquiring  financial  technology  required
for  effective  and  economical  lending  to  small  enterprises,  or to  open  a branch
in an unbanked  area,  can  make it  possible  for  the  bank to introduce  financial
instruments  suited  to the  needs  of the  potential  depositors  and  borrowers. 22
Thus, the impact  of policy intervention  on the capital  markets  should  be
judged  on  the  basis  of  this  simple  criterion:  does  it  reduce  overall  transaction
costs  and  risk  associated  with  financial  transactions.  If  it  does  not  have  this
cost-risk  reducing  effect, tt  would  harm rather  than  help the evolution  and
integration  of capital  markets.23
The financial  innovations  essential  for  effective  and  viable financing  cf
small  enterprises  (including  small farms)  and for mobilizing  resources  from
small savers are illustrated  by the following  case study of an innovative
commercial  bank - the  Syndicate  Bank.
XV.  "aN UYNDICKUg  XXPRIIUNCE
Till 1969, the large  city-based  banks in India  concentrated  on financing
large  industry  and  trade  in  the  urban  areas. Their  transaction  costs  for  these
markets  were  quite  low  - well  within  the  range  of 1.5  to  2  percent,  which  Keynes
indicated  many  years  back  as  the  level  below  which  interest  rates  cannot  fall. 2'
They  dic!  not  enter  the  field  of  small-medium  enterprises  in  the  farm  and  nonfarm
sectors. In  these  markets,  their  transaction  costs  would  have  been  very  high,
and  at  the  terms  on  which  they  could  have  lent,  it  was  not  possible  co  widen  and
deepen  these  markets.
It was difficult  for  a new bank to compete  with these  city  banks in their
markets.  It  had  to  enter  a  new  field  - a  noncompecltive  field  - and  this  related
to  small-medium  enterprises.  This  objective  opportunity  was  there,  but  to  seize
it  required  an  innovative  approach  to  banking  - introduction  of  new  products  and
processes  to  reduce  transaction  costs. And  this  is  precisely  what  the  Syndicate
Bank  did  since  its  origin  in 1925.25
Charaoteristics  of  the  Syndicate
The  Syndicate  Bank  was  located  in  the  small  town  of  Manipal,  India  (the  only
bank  with a head office  in a rural  area),  and  started  with an initial  paid-up
capital  of  only  8,000  rupees.  Its  growth  has  been  remarkable.  From  a  negligible
share  in  banking  business  till  1950,  its  share  rose  co about  1  percent  in 1960
and  4 percent  in  1975.  St.ll,  it  was  unlike  the  city-based  banks  particularly
till 1969.  when it was nationalized  along  with the thirteen  major  banks.  In
1968,  32 percent  of its  branches  were in rural  areas;  for the  entire  banking
system, the share of rural branches  was only 22 percent.  Its loans to
agriculture  and  small  enterprises  constituted  30  percent  of its  total  loans;  for
the other  banks, such loans ozere  less than 8 percent  of their total loans.
Ninety  percent  of its deposit  accounts  were small  accounts  (below  Rs. 1,500)
accounting  for 50 percent  of its deposits;  and 50 percent  of its borrowing
accounts  related  to small-medium  enterprises,  their  share in total  borrowing10
being  30  percent.
Its  average  interest  rate  on loans  was  not  much  higher  than  that  of the  city
banks;  in  the  1950s  and  1960s,  it  was  about  2  percentage  points  higher  than  that
of  the  State  Bank  of  India  - the  largest  commercial  bank. Since  the  early  1970s,
the  rate  has  been  more  or  less  the  same  as that  charged  by the  major  city  banks.
How did it, ther,,  manage  to grow so rapidly,  even with concentration  on
markets that the city banks found to be unremunerative?  Obviously, its
transaction  costs  must have been  comparable  to the  costs  of lending  to large
industry  and  trade  by the  city  banks.
Transaction  Costs  and  Functional  Cost  structure
Complete  data on the  cost structure  of the  city banks are not available.
However,  the  data  on  establishment  expenses  are  available;  establishment  expenses
include  a large  part of administrative  costs  but do not include  default risk
(bad  debt  provision).  The  ratio  of  establishment  expenses  to  total  deposits  for
the  Syndicate  was slightly  higher  than  that  for  the  hanking  system  in 1951  and
1961. Since  then  this  ratio  has  been  somewhat  lower  for  the  Syndicate  than  that
for  the  banking  system. Quite  surprisingly,  the  Syndicate  ratio  is  comparable
to  that  of the  insured  commercial  banks  in  the  United  States.
Much  more interesting,  however,  would  be the  comparison  of the functional
cost structure  of the Syndicate  with the other city banks, who have been
financing  small-medium  enterprises  particularly  since  1969. However,  such  data
are  not  available  for  any  bank  in  any  country.  Even  for  the  Syndicate,  such  data
could  be obtained  only  for  1975;  they  were  compiled  by the  Syndicate  especially
for  our  purposes. One  other  major  commercial  bank  located  in  Bombay  could  give
us these  data  again  only  for  1975.
The  overall  transaction  costs  of the  city  bank  are  lower  than  those  for  the
Syndicate. This  was to  be expected  since  this  city  bank's  lending  to small
enterprises  constitutes  only  25 to 30  percent  of its  total  lending,  while  the
share  of small  enterprise  lending  in the total  for the  Syndicate  is about  40
percent.  However,  the  city  bank's  costs  are  more  than  three  times  those  of  the
Syndicate  for  lending  to agriculture  and  small  enterprises.
For  deposit  mobilization,  the  Syndicate's  administrative  costs  are  much  lower
than  those  of the  city  bank. The interest  costs  of deposits  are  somewhat  lower
for  the  city  bank  as demand  deposits  constitute  a  much  higher  proportion  of its
total  deposits.
But how has the Syndicate  been able to service  a large number  of small
accounts  - deposit  as  well as borrowing  accounts  - and thus  provide  credit  to
the small  enterprises  at a cost that is much below that of the city  banks?
Briefly,  the answer is an innovative  approach  to banking.  The creative
adaptation  of the  banking  technology  to suit  local  conditions  seems  to explain11
this  phenomenon.
Factors  Accounting  for  Low  Transaction  C>sts
New Entreireneurs.  This  new  style  of  banking  was  possible  because  of the
characteristics  of the  leaders.26  The  promoters  came  from  a lower-middle  class
background;  they  belonged  to a community  that  respects  learning. None  of them
came  from  an industrial  house. The  city  banks  were  started  by  promoters  who  had
close  links  with large  industry. Of the three  promoters,  one was a medical
doctor,  one  an engineer,  and  the  third  a trader  dealing  in  hand-loom  cloth.
All of them were participants  in the movement  of socioeconomic  reform
initiated  by Mahatma  Ghandi. They  wanted  to improve  the  socioeconomic  status
of the  community  and  tne  region  to  which  they  belonged. Hard  work,  education,
and  thrift  - these  they  considered  crucial  for  socioeconomic  reform. They  had
not only a passion for reform  but also a hard-headed  business  sense.  They
considered  banking  as an instrument  for  the  purpose;  to serve  as an effective
instrument,  it  had to  be viable  and  gain  vitality  for  growth.
They were responsible  for establishing  a school  in each  village in their
district  and  an  education  complex,  &f type  of  university  center  at their  village
of  Hanipal. The  bank  management  helped  the  process,  but  at  the  same  time  it  was
conscious  of the  deposit  potential  of these  institutions.  The bank provided
employment  opportunities  for  the  educated  members  of the  local  community.  This
helped  in  terms  of  having  a  dependable  and  dedicated  staff. The  bank  helped  the
farmers and small enterprises  by providing  technical  assistance;  but such
assistance  enlarged  their  business. The  bank  cultivated  the  habit  of thrift  in
the community  through  a new deposit scheme  called  pigmy deposit,  but this
enlarged  the  bank's  resources.
Recruitment  and  Promotion  Policies. The  major  factor
responsible  for the relatively  high productivity  of the staff  has been the
Syndicate  Bank's  recruitment  policy." Relatively  unsophisticated  persons  with
local  contact  and  rural  or  semi-urban  background  are  selected. Unlike  the  city
banks,  the Syndicate  Bank  has  preferred  high school  graduates  to graduates  or
post-graduates  from  a university. Their  familiarity  with the  local  scene  and
their  contacts  enable  them  to  expand  Syndicate  business  in a variety  of ways;
they  inspire  confidence  in  potential  depositors,  and they  are  able  to  appraise
well the sourndness  of projects  and the  creditworthiness  oi borrowers  and to
assess the business potential  of the area in which they function.  The
information  costs  thus  are  reduced;  persons  without  this  background  would  have
to collect  more information  and spend  more effort  and time in appraising  the
soundness  of borrowers  and  their  schemes.
Since  they  are  high school  graduates,  they  enter  the  banking  business  at a
fairly  young  age  and  thus  are  more  adaptable.  Again,  since  they  would  not  have
gotten  such a job in the  city banks,  they  consider  themselves  fortunate  and
hence  are  more  dedicated,  dependable,  and  disciplined  than  the  graduates.  They
are  prepared  to  do considerable  field  work,  which  is  essentiai  for  attracting,
maintaining,  and supervising  small  accounts. And,  of course,  their  pay scales
are  lower  than  those  for  the  graduates  in  the  city  banks.  The  Syndicate  average12
salary  per employee  even  now is 20 to 30 percent  lower  than that  in the  city
banks.  And the staff's  academic  qualifications  are adequate  for the  banking
business. Persons  with  university  degrees  are  overqualified  for  many  bank  jobs.
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  institution,  such  persons  are  less  adaptable,  more
ambitious,  and  less  disciplined  than  those  who  have  completed  high school.
The promotion  policy  of the  bank  builds  staff  morale  and attempts  to avoid
discontent  and demoralization. Somewhat  on the  Japanese  style,  a person  is
promoted  in terms  of salary  and  grade  on the  basis  of  seniority,  provided  there
.re  no  consecutive  adverse  reports  on  his  efficiency.  But  such  a  promotion  does
not  mean that  he  would  get  a  more  responsible  functional  assignment.  Seniority
promotion  in  a  salary  grade  is  divorced  from  functional  promotion.  Responsible
positions  are  assigned  to  bright  persons  without  affecting  adversely  the  salary
promotion  of others  and without  affecting  favorably  their  own salary  grades.
Functional  promotion  thus  is  a type  of reward  for  the  really  deserving;  he wins
recognition  for  his  worth. The  others  are  not  discontented  since  their  salary
promotions  are  not  affected.
This divorce  of functional  promotion  from seniority  promotion  in a salary
grade  helps  the  bank  in  selecting  persons  for  senior  management  positions. For
the top  few  jobs,  which  are on a pure  selection  basis,  the  bank has a choice
from  among  the  persons  who are  really  competent  -those  who are promoted  to a
higher  function.
Another  characteristic  of the bank's  recruitment  policy  is worth noting.
When feasible,  the  bank recruits  married  couples.  These  couples  have proved
to  be more  stable,  reliable,  and  dedicated  than  other  employees.
This recruitment  and promotion  policy  is reflected  in the  productivity  of
the  Syndicate  employees.  The  deposit  accounts  handled  per  employee  are  287  for
the Syndicate,  while they are only 120 for the banking  system  as a whole.
Again,  the  borrowing  accounts  per employee  are forty-eight  for the  Syndicate
and only fourteen  for the banking system.  The Syndicate's  productivity
differential  compared  with  the  city  banks'  would  be  much  greater  than  what  these
figures  indicate  for  the  comparison  is  with the  average  for  the  banking  system
as a whole.  If the  wage differential  is considered  along  with the physical
productivity  differential,  the productivity  differential  in financial  terms
would  be much  more significant  than  the  physical  productivity  differential.
Technical  Assistance. The  bank  provides  technical  assistance  to farmers  as
well  as to small  industrialists.  It  has  a  special  staff  for  this  purpose. The
farm representatives  are a special  cadre  of young  officers  recruited  from  the
agricultural  universities  and specially  trained for the banking business.
Similarly,  for the  small  industry  sector,  the  bank  has a cadre  of industrial
engineers  and  technicians.
Each  one of these  officers  looks  after  about  five  to ten  branches  depending
upon local  conditions.  The  bank's  policy  of opening  branches  in  clusters  in  a
given  region  helps  it  to  spread  the  costs  of these  special  cadres  over  a number
of geographically  contiguous  branches.
The technical  assistance  provided  helps  the  borrowers;  at the  same time it13
enlarges  the  bank's  business  and reduces  its  risk.  These  special  cadres  are
able to appraise  credit  proposals  in the  field.  Their  periodic  field  visits
also provide  an effective  machinery  for supervision  as well as recovery  of
loans.
Decentralized  Decisionmaking  and  Avoidance  of  Paper  Work. The  volume  of  work
involved  cannot  be effectively  handled  without  decentralized  decisionmaking.
The  loans  to  farmers  and  small  enterprises  are  sanctioned  by  the  branch  managers
with the advice  of the technical  cadre;  there is no reference  to the head
office,  and thus  the  head  office  costs  for  such  loans  are  negligible.
The emphasis  is on field  work not desk work.  Local decisionmaking  and
initia",'ve  are  valued.  The  branch  and the  branch  manager  are judged  on the
volump  of  deposits  and  the  magnitude  of  loans  and  their  recovery.  The  bank  thus
exercises  the  utmost  economy  in the  sphere  of documenting  information  and its
transmittal  to  the  head  office. Such  reporting  procedures  would  increase  costs
and divert the attention  of the branch manager from banking business to
collecting and  documenting information,  which  is  hardly  relevant for
decisionmaking  either  at the  branch  or at the  head  office.
Since  nationalization  in 1969,  information  costs  have increased  because  of
the directives  and  requirements  of the  Reserve  Bank  of India. The management
is  attempting,  however,  to  keep  them  within  limits. The  central  banks  and  the
international  banks  do  have  a craze  for  information  and  demand  such  information
from  the intermediary  and  final  lending  agencies  - a type  of information  that
may  be enlightening  for  researchers  but is  irrelevant  for  real  decisionmaking;
they  still  have to realize  that  there  are  costs  involved  - sometimes  as large
as 1  to  2  percent  of the  loan  portfolio.  Instead  of  reducing  transaction  costs,
they  raise  them. 
2 8
Innovative  Deposit  Schemes. The  bank  has  introduced  a  variety  of  innovative
deposit  schemes  linked  to  motives  to  save. One  recent  example  is  the  Farmers'
Protection  Deposit  Scheme.  In times  of dire necessity  arising  out of crop
failure,  the farmer is eligible  for a loan equal to double the amount of
deposits  outstanding  in  his account. This  deposit  earns  interest  at 5  percent
per year, and the loan is at a concessional  rate of 9 percent  per year -
repayable  over  a  period  of  three  years. The  small  farmer  does  not  save  normally
in the  form  of a financial  asset;  interest  rate  on deposits  is  not much  of an
attraction  to  him,  particularly  when  his  transaction  costs  are  high. But  he  can
be induced  to save in  the form  of a deposit  if it is linked  with  borrowing  at
a time  of crop  failure. In the  absence  of  crop insurance,  this  is the  type  of
saving  that  the  farmArs  need. 29
This  principle  of linking  deposits  with lending  for  a specific  purpose  has
been applied  by the  bank in several  cases. A farmer,  for  example,  would  get  a
loan  for  the  purchase  of  a  pump  set  if  he  has  accumulat;ed  25  percent  of  the  cost
as fixed  or saving  deposits. A small  industrialist  gets  a loan  for  machinery
purchase  if  he accumulates  more  than  20  percent  of the  cost  as deposits. Such
schemes  help the  bank  to  mobilize  deposits  as  well  as to  judge  the  seriousness
of purpose  of the  borrower.  Because  of the  assurance  of a loan,  the  borrower
has inducement  to save. Without  such  assurance  in  many cases  there  would  not
be saving  enough  for investment,  and  hence  there  would  be a strong  temptation14
to use  up the  funds  for  financing  emergencies  or social  expenditures.
The  bank  is  particularly  known  for  its  Pigmy  Deposit,  a scheme  introduced  in
1928  as part  of its  crusade  to inculcate  the  habit  of thrift  among  relatively
poor people.  The  promoters regarded the  Pigmy Deposit as  a  business
opportunity.  This  opportunity  was  not  seized  by the  other  banks  because  of the
transaction  costs  involved  in  collecting  small  deposits  from  a large  number  of
relatively  uneducated  and  poor  customers.
The scheme,  however,  proved  to be financially  profitable  for the  Syndicate
and attractive  to the depositors. The principle  of the scheme  was simple:
door-to-door  collection  of a given  amount  of deposits  (as  low  as 25 paise)  at
stated  intervals.  It  was  thought  that  many  people  - workers,  petty  shopkeepers,
vegetable  vendors,  hawkers,  small  traders  - could  save  these  small  amounts  per
day or week or month.  But they  do not  have time  to go to a bank and  deposit
this amount  regularly. This  potential  saving  was not  realized  since  the  poor
had no semicontractual  obligation  to accumulate. With agents  appointed  to
collect  such  deposits,  this  saving  capacity  and  inclination  can  be tapped.
And  thus the Syndicate introduced  this Pigmy Deposit to be  collected
periodically  from  the  doorsteps  of the  saver. The commission  rate  was linked
with the  amount  of deposits  collected,  and it  has not exceeded  3 percent  per
year.  The  interest  was  3.13  percent  per  year  if  the  saver  did  not  withdraw  from
the scheme for seven years.  A  depositor  saving  0.12 rupees  daily could
accumulate  at the  end of the  seventh  year  Rs.  350.  Within  this period,  the
saver  could  borrow  from  the  bank  against  the  security  of his  deposit.
Such  was  the  original  scheme. Its  specific  features  have  varied  since  1969,
but  the  broad  principle  remains  the  same.
On an average,  the total  cost to the bank of this long-term  deposit  has
varied  between  3 and  5  percent  per  year - significantly  lower  than  the  cost  of
a three-  to  five-year  fixed  deposit.  Even  in  1975,  the  total  cost  was  only  5.52
percent  compared  with the  cost  of fixed  deposits  at 13  percent.
The bank thus seized  a business  opportunity  without  competition  from the
other  banks  until 1960.  The Pigmy  Deposits  constituted  14 to 15 percent  of
total  deposits  in  1946;  this  proportion  rose  to  21  percent  in  1960. Since  then,
its relative  significance  has declined  with the faster  growth  of the other
deposits  and  competition  from  the  other  banks. But  even  in  1975  these  deposits
constituted  7 to 8 percent  of total  deposits. In  absolute  terms,  these  Pigmy
Deposits  are  currently  more  than  ten  times  their  amount  in  1960.
Such a deposit  er'ibled  the saver in seven  years to accumulate  a fairly
sizable  sum. Without  this  facility,  he probably  would  not  have saved  or saved
less. His  motivation  to  save  has  been  to  accumulate  for  an emergency  or  other
anticipated  expenditures  rather  than  to earn interest. The deposit  thus has
been linked  with this  type  of  motive  among  the  relatively  poor. 30
Even  the  commission  paid  to  the  agents  has  not  been  a net  loss  to the  bank.
The  agent  must  keep  a  security  deposit  with  the  bank  equal  to  10  percent  of  his
commission.  This minimizes  the danger  of the agent disappearing  with his15
collection.
Central  Bank  Response  to  8yndicat.  Innovations
The  Central  Bank - Reserve  Bank  of India  - also  has  been innovative. 
31 But
with  regard  to  the  unconventional  practices  of the  Syndicate,  it  took  a  negative
attitude. Up  until  1965  the  Syndicate  was  considered  an  unsophisticated,  rural
bank, and the Central  Bank did not like some of its innovations. Central
regulatory  agencies  -particularly  when  they  try  to  imitate  rather  than  adapt  the
technology  of a  developed  country  - can  come  in the  way  of creative  adaptation
of  modern  techno'  gy.
Wi'l regard  to  the  Pigmy  Deposits,  the  Syndicate  permitted  its  own  employees
to woi  as agents  during  their  spare  time.  For the  bank this  was one  of the
ways  of reducing  its  wage  costs  and increasing  its  business;  for  the  employee,
it was an incentive  to earn  more.  But in 1962,  the Central  Bank found  this
practice  to be objectionable  on strict  banking  principles  and  prohibited  the
Syndicate  from  engaging  its  own  employees  as agents.
The  Syndicate  wanted  to  set  up  an agricultural  demonstration  farm  in  1964  to
enable  it to promote  the  adoption  of new high-yielding  seeds  by the farmers.
The  Central  Bank  considered  such  a  venture  in  technical  assistance  inconsistent
with healthy  banking  practices. Hence,  the Syndicate  had to think  of other
ways.  It induced  the  progressive  farmers  to set  up a voluntary  organization
called the Syndicate  Agricultural  Foundation. The bank provides  financial
assistance  to the  foundation  through  annual  grants.
In 1960, the bank pioneered a  unique investment  service through its
Investors'  Agency  Department. This setrice  enabled  middle-income  savers  to
invest  in shares  of reputable  companies. The  persons  joining  the scheme  were
ensured  a return  of  9 to  10  percent  per  year  on  their  saving;  the  bank,  in  turn,
invested  these  sums in shares. This scheme  became  very  popular  with middle-
income  groups  in  semi-urban  areas--persons  who  were  not  familiar  with the  stock
market. It  was  a  precursor  to  the  Unit  Trust  of India  sponsored  by the  Central
Bank in 1964.  The following  year the Syndicate's  investment  service  ended
because  the  Central  Bank  thought  it  could  compete  with  the  Unit  Trust  of India.
Since  nationalization  of fourteen  major  banks  in 1969,  the  Central  Bank  has
induced  the banks to expand  their  branches  in rural  areas  so as to provide
credit  to small  enterprises  in  both the  farm  and  nonfarm  sectors. With this
emphasis  on the  widening  and  deepening  of  the  geographical  and  functional  scope
of the  banking  system,  the  Syndicate  has recently  been  regarded  by the  Central
Bank  as a  model  bank.
V.  CONCLUSION
Credit  or finance  is one of the  strategic  factors  that  determine  the  pace16
and  pattern  of  socioeconomic  development.  It  facilitiates  as  well  as  stimulates
the development  process. 32 Thus, the credit  or financial  system  has what
economists  call  externality.  Public  or  government  intervention  is  essential  to
promote  and  develop  a sound  credit  system. The  public  agency  that  must  perform
this function  is obviously  the central  bank, which  has to act as a leader,
promoter,  coordinator,  and regulator  of the  entire  financial  system.
It  is the  function  of  the  central  bank  to  promote  financial  innovations  that
widen  and deepen  the  credit  or capital  market  through  the  introduction  of new
processes  and  products  (credit  instruments),  cultivation  and  nurturing  of new
markets,  and introduction  of new institutional  and  organizational  structures.
The  single  most  important  criterion  of  the  effectiveness  of  central  bank  action
is the extent  to  which its  policies  reduce  overall  transaction  costs  and risk
relating  to  .11  types  of credit  transactions,  essential  for  accelerating  the
pace of development  in the light  of the country's  development  objectives  and
strategy. For  this  purpose,  a  central  bank  in  a  developLnf  country  has  to  have,
what I  have  called  elsewhere,  a development  orientation.3
A  credit  system  can  also  distort  and  obstruct  the  development  process  because
of what  Keynes  calls  "the  inherent  instability  of credit." 34 To quote  Hicks:
But on the other side there is the penalty  that the credit  system is an
unstable  system. It rests  upon  confidence  and trust;  when trust  is absent,
it can just shrivel  up.  It is unstable  in the  other  direction  too; when
there is too much "confidence"  or optimism  it can explode in bursts  of
speculation.  Thus,  in  order  for  a  credit  system  to  work smoothly,  it  needs
an institutional  framework  which  shall  restrain  it  on  the  one  hand,  and  shall
support  it on the  other . . . it must  be managed  by a central  bank,  whose
operations  must be  determined  by judgement,  and cannot be  reduced to
procedure  by a  mechanical  rule.35
A central  bank in developing  countries  can  perform  this  regulatory  function
much more effectively  when it also  promotes  a sound  and  healthy  financial  or
credit  system. Regulatory  and  promotional  functions  are  vitally  interrelated.
To perform  both  these  functions  effectively,  a  central  bank  must  have  a  certain
degree  of autonomy. 36 This autonomy  has eroded,  especially  since 1965, in
developing  countries  and  developed  countries  like  the  United  States  because  of
the impact  of fiscal  policy  on the  credit  or financial  markets  - national  as
well  as  international.  The  result has been  instability  of  credit and
international debt  crisis,  already affecting the  development process
particularly  in some of the developing  countries  and the functioning  of the
international  credit  markets.
The autonomy  of central  banks and the  conditions  for the emergence  of an
international  central bank are  complex issues; they are  related to  the
discipline  of political  sociology  - a type of inquiry  that can analyze  the
causal  factors  responsible  for  the  behavior  of actors  in the  political  field.17
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got  was a Currency  Board . . . the IMF.  That,  we are
finding,  . . . is  not  enough.  (pp.  172-172)
36.  Central  Banks  do not have this autonomy  either  in the developing or the
developed  countries.  This is indeed  a  political  problem.  In this
connection,  see  Hicks,  Economic  Perspectives.  To quote:
This  perhaps  is  a dream;  I do  not claim  to  be a judge  of
political  possibilities.  But  I  am  not  afraid  to  draw  the
moral, which emerges rather clearly from the line of
thought  I have tried  to follow  out,  that the  issue  with
which  we  have  been  concerned is  political  -even
constitutional  - as well as economic.  There is the
technical  economic  problem  of the Instrument;  but it is
tied  up with the  political  problem  of  how to secure  that
it is  used  decisively.  This  is  a  problem  which  Keynesian
economics,  so it seems  to  me,  has refused  to face;  while
the monetarists,  who have seen it, have to face the
political  implications.  For  myself,  I  would  face  it.  I
think  we should  say that  monetary  regulation  is a major
function  of  Government;  but  we should  emphasize  that if
it is to be exercised  decisively,  it needs to be
separated,  in  what is in fact  the  constitutional  sense,
from other functions. We need to remember  the ancient
doctrine  of  the Separation  of Powers.  The judicial
function,  in well-ordered  States,  is recognized  to be a
function  of Government,  but a function  that is better
separated.  So  it  is  with  the  monetary  function.  (pp.  132-
133,  emphasis  added)24
APP8JIDIX  TA18E25
Table  1.  Syndicate  Bank  and  the  Commercial  Banking  System.
Selected  Years  1960-74  (percentage  sharel
Category  1960  1965  1970  1974
Deposits  0.9  1.8  2.6  4.0
Loans  and
Advances  1.0  1.7  2.6  3.9
Branches  2.9  3.3  4.1  3.8
Borrowing
Accounts  - 15.0  - 12.0
Source:  N. K. Thingalaya,  Innovations  in  Banking: The  Syndicate  Experience,
Domestic  Finance  Studies  No.  46 (Washington  D. C.:  World  Bank,
Development  Economics  Department,  1978).26
Table  2.  Syndicate  Bank  and  the  Banking  System: Some  Indicators.  1968  and 1975
(in  Rercent)
Syndicate  Bank  Banking  System
Category  1968  1975  1968  1975
1.  Rural  Branches/
Total  Branches  32  39  22  37
2.  Rural  Deposits/
Total Deposits  - 12  - 8
3.  Agricultural  Advances/
Total  Advances  12  13  0.3  10
4.  Advances  to Small  Industry/
Total  Advances  11  14  8  12
5.  Advances  to Small  Business/
Total  Advance  7  14  negligible  8
6.  Share  of 3+4+5  in  Total
Advance  30  41  8.3  30
7.  Borrowing  Accounts  under
3,  4, & 5/Total  Borrowing
Accounts  50  65
8.  Deposit  Accounts  under
Rs.  1,500/Total  Deposit
Accounts  90  89
9.  Deposits  for  Deposit  Accounts
under  Rs.  1,500/Total
Deposit  50  50
Source: Same  as in  Table  1.27
Table  3.  Structure  of Costs: Syndicate  Bank.  Selected  Years  1950-75
Type  of Cost  Percentage  of  Total  Assets
1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975
A. Operating  Costs  5.03  4.76  5.69  6.40  8.00  10.01
B. DeRosit  Costs  3.05  3.39  4.30  4.39  5.39  7.39
(a)Administrative  Costs  1.53  1.55  1.64  1.59  1.64  1.66
(b)Interest  Costs  1.53  1.85  2.66  2.80  3.75  5.72
C. Total  Cost  of  Loans
and  Investments  0.73  0.66  1.13  1.90  2.46  2.46
(a)  Administrative  Costs  0.60  0.49  0.96  1.73  2.17  2.20
(b)  Default  Risk  0.13  0.17  0.17  0.16  0.29  0.27
D. Cost  of Excess  Capacit*  1.25  0.70  0.25  0.11  0.15  0.15
E. Total  Cost (B(a)  +  C(a)
+  C(b)  -&.D)  3.51  2.31  3.02  3.60  4.25  4.27
(Other  than  Interest  Cost
on Deposits)
F. Total  Earnings  7.84  5.75  7.46  7.52  8.30  10.23
*Note: Represents  the  losses  of new  branches  during  their  gestation  period:  four
years  for  rural  branches,  two  years  for  semi-urban  branches,  and  one  year
for  urban-metropolitan  branches.
Source:  The  same  as in  Table  1.28
Table 4.  Cost Structure:  Loans and Advances, 1975 (as  percentage of  total  under each category)
Sector  Svndicate Bank  Larne Netrowolitan  Bank (Boamay)
Admin. Costs  Default  Total  Adnin.  Costs  Default  Total
Risk  Risk
Aariculture  0.80  1.00  1.80  6.06  1.39  7.45
Small  Industry  0.85  0.79  1.64  5.18  1.86  6.04
Other  Small
EnterDrises  2.75  1.00  3.75
Total:  Loans
and Advances  2.24  0.52  2.76  1.70  0.70  2.20
Source:  For Syndicate Bank, the  some  as in  Table 1. For the  large Metropolitan  Bank
(Borbay),  the data  were given  by the  bank concerned; It  does not  want its  identity  to
be revealed.29
Table  5.  Cost  Structure: DeRosits  of Syndicate  Bank: 1975
(as  percentage  of total  deposits  under  each  category)
Degosit Category
Cost  Item  Current Pigmy  Savings Fixed  & Cummulative'  Total
Deposits
Interest
Costs  - 0.48  4.30  11.70  6.86
Incentives  &
Commissions  - 3.94  0.09  0.01  0.14
Administrative
Costs  0.20  1.10  2.57  1.30  1.55
Total  0.20  5.52  6.96  13.01  8.55
Source: The  same  as in  Table  1.
Large
Metropolitan  Interest  Costs  6.50
Bank  (Bombay)  Other  costs  3.29
Total  9.79
Source: The  Bank.30
Table  6:  Establishment  Cost  as a Percentage  ofTotal  Deposits,  Selected
Years  1951-75
Year  Syndicate  Bank  Banking  System  United  States  - All Insured
Commercial  Banks
1951  2.27  1.70
1961  2.12  1.80
1971  2.80  3.00
1975  3.02  3.06  2.90
Source: For  Syndicate  Bank,  the  same  as in  Table  I.  For  the  Banking
System  in  India,  Centre  for  Monitoring  Indian  Economy,  Basic
Statistics  Relating  to the  Indian  Economy,  vol.  1:  All  India
(September  1977,  Bombay),  Table  19.1. For  the  United  States,
Federal  Reserve  bulletin  vol.  63,no.  7, (July  1977).31
Table  7.  Structure  of Deposits.  Selected  years  1950-75  (Rs.  Million)
Year  Current  Pigmy  Savings  Fixed  Total
1950  7.0  6.9  7.0  16.0  23.9
(19.0)  (18.7)  (19.0)  (43.4)  (100.0)
1955  9.0  15.5  15.0  27.2  66.7
(13.5)  (23.2)  (22.5)  (40.8)  (100.0)
1960  20.3  39.1  35.7  93.6  188.7
(10.8)  (20.7)  (18.9)  (49.6)  (100.0)
1965  104.0  93.6  124.3  269.2  591.1
(17.6)  (15.8)  (21.0)  (45.5)  (100.0)
1970  258.7  154.3  396.1  868.4  1.677.5
(15.4)  (9.2)  (23.6)  (51.8)  (100.0)
1975  892.1  397.3  1,322.4  2,754.2  5.366.0
(16.6)  (7.4)  (24.6)  (51.3)  (100.0)
Note:  Figures  in  parentheses  represent  percentage  of the  total.
Source: Same  as in  Table  I.32
Table  8. Growth  of Pigmy  Deposits: Branch  Category-wise.  Selected  Years
1950-75  (Rupees  O00's)
Number
Year  Rural  Semi-Urban  Urban  Metropolitan  Total  of
Branches
1950  510  2,869  2,447  1,107  6,933  79
(7.4)  (41.4)  (35.3)  (16.0)  (100)
1955 1,142  6,129  6,116  2,119  15,506  93
(7.4)  (39.5)  (39.4)  (13.7)  (100)
1960  1,961  14,519  12,957  9,678  39,115  139
(5.0)  (37.1)  (33.1)  (24.7)  (100)
1965  7,360  32,102  30,976  23,136  93,574  204
(7.9)  (34.3)  (33.1)  (24.7)  (100)
1970  14,198  50,156  45,681  44,292  154,327  461
(9.2)  (32.5)  (29.6)  (28.7)  (100)
1975  49,050  121,150  110,420  116,680  397,300  778
(12.3)  (30.5)  (27.8)  (29.4)  (100)
Note:  Figures  in parentheses  represent  percentage  of Total  Pigmy
Deposits.
Source: Same  as in Statement  I.PPR  Working  Paper  Serias
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